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Abstract 
A submarine's sonar team is responsible for 
detecting, localising and classifying targets using 
information provided by the platform's sensor 
suite. The information used to make these 
assessments is typically uncertain and/or 
incomplete and is likely to require a measure of 
confidence in its reliability. Moreover, 
improvements in sensor and communication 
technology are resulting in increased amounts of 
on-platform and off-platform information 
available for evaluation. This proliferation of 
imprecise information increases the risk of 
overwhelming the operator. To assist the task of 
localisation and classification a concept 
demonstration decision aid (Horizon), based on 
evidential reasoning, has been developed. 
Horizon is an information fusion software 
package for representing and fusing imprecise 
information about the state of the world, 
expressed across suitable frames of reference. 
The Horizon software is currently at prototype 
stage. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The combat system is an integral part of the command 
and control of a naval vessel as it is responsible for the 
collection, processing and transmission of this 
information. Recent advances in sensor technology and 
communications have seen a dramatic increase in the 
amount of data available for processing. This translates to 
an increase in the amount of information available to be 
evaluated by command (e.g., target classification by the 
sonar supervisor). Often this information is uncertain, 
incomplete and inconclusive and is likely to include a 
measure of confidence in the reliability of its source (see 
section 2). In target classification and threat assessment 
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one must use all available information to determine the 
target's identity and capabilities. To reduce the risk of 
information overload and assist the sonar supervisor in 
performing classification in an accurate and timely 
manner, a concept demonstration decision aid (Horizon) 
has been developed. 
Horizon is based on a methodology for representing and 
reasoning with information from disparate sources, 
expressed across a number of frames of reference, called 
evidential reasoning (Lowrance et a/ 1991 ). Horizon 
provides an environment for the operator to propagates 
and fuse the initial information to produce a measure of 
confidence in a target's classification. The initial 
information can be translated, discounted or fused, using 
one of three algorithms, in a graphical manner. Horizon is 
a concept demonstration software package that is also 
being applied to mine threat evaluation (Mansell 1996) 
and air combat post mission analysis (Mansell 1997) 
domains. 
This paper discusses the information fusion problem as it 
applies to target classification and the development of an 
information fusion decision aides (Horizon). Horizon 
draws on the established evidential reasoning techniques 
and adds a new fusion algorithm for combining 
dependent evidence, as well as automated discounting and 
explanation facilities. The paper also highlights some of 
the practical issues associated with designing an 
information fusion system to be used by non-technical 
domain experts (Navy personnel). 
2. TARGET CLASSIFICATION 
The process of target classification has numerous 
definitions in navies around the world. These definitions 
essentially provide a methodology for deriving a contact 
description at one of the following classification levels; 
(I) general classification (e.g., submarine) (2) vessel type 
(e.g., SSK) and operation condition, (3) nationality and 
class (e.g., Canadian Oberon class), or (4) particular unit 
(e.g., Onondaga). The target classification problem should 
not be considered a finite process; rather it is the 
derivation of essential contact information from a 
dynamic environment. The operator' s overall task in this 
process is to participate with command in target detection, 
localisation, and identification (i.e., target acquisition). 
This is achieved by the operator interpreting the data 
presented on his screen(s), and translating that into 
informative reports to command to permit tactical 
decisions to be made (Donald, 1996a, b). 
To assist the operator in target classification a decision 
aid must be sufficiently flexible to reason at all levels of 
classification (be it general classification, type, 
nationality, class, or unit) using the information as it 
becomes available. The operator will use the decision aid 
to continuously evaluate the available evidence and report 
classification information to command. The level of 
classification in the report depends on the quality of 
information and current operational conditions. 
To further complicate the classification process, the 
operator must deal with information that is derived from 
an environmentally hostile medium (ie the ocean). As an 
example, sound transmission often occurs in surges and 
fades, and rarely will all radiated frequencies be 
detectable at the same time and place. It is the sonar 
supervisor' s task to consider all the available, imprecise 
sensor and intelligence information and to provide a 
classification for sonar contacts. That includes 
information from the following sources: 
• Raw bearing only information interpreted by the 
acoustic (sonar) operators. 
• Individual tone information provided by processing 
the radiated sounds in narrow frequency bands (e.g., 
gear tonals). 
• Harmonic sets information as it relates to machinery 
on the target platform. 
• Transients information interpreted by the acoustic 
sensor operator or from automated transients analysis 
system. 
• Detection of emissions from the target vessel's active 
sonar. 
• Aural classification using the experience of the sensor 
operator. 
• Visual information provided by the periscope. 
• Electronic support measures (ESM) information (e.g., 
radar emissions). 
• Radar. 
• Intelligence identifying what one expects to fmd in the 
area. 
Horizon has been developed as a flexible decision aid that 
can reason with imprecise information from the above 
sources. Horizon uses a unique combination of existing 
and novel evidential reasoning techniques to provide a 
mathematically rigorous formalism for combining bodies 
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of evidence at different levels of abstraction {see the 
following section). 
3. EVIDENTIAL 
HORIZON 
REASONING IN 
Evidential reasoning (Lowrance et a! 1991) is a 
formalism for representing information from disparate 
sources that is expressed in different frames of reference, 
and provides techniques to manipulate that information. 
Evidential reasoning (E-R) is an extension of Shafer's 
( 1976) work on belief functions (called Dempster-Shafer 
Theory) . Being a departure from classical probability 
theory, E-R uses information that is typically uncertain, 
incomplete and error-prone. E-R maintains the 
association between the measure of belief and 
disjunctions of events rather than forcing probabilities to 
be distributed across atomic possibilities. 
E-R is used to assess the effect of all pieces of available 
evidence on a hypothesis, making use of domain-specific 
knowledge. A propositional space called the frame of 
discernment (or frame) is used to defme a set of basic 
statements, exactly one of which may be true at any one 
time, and a subset of these statements is defmed as a 
propositional statement. For example, a frame, eA> may 
be used to represent a targets category (this 
implementation of the target classification domain 
currently uses 16 frames to describe the environment as 
shown in Figure 1). 
Once frames have been established, basic probability 
assignments (BPA) are use to make probabilistic 
assessments about the confidence in propositional 
statements relative to the frame. Belief assigned to non­
atomic propositional statements explicitly represents the 
lack of information available to resolve between the 
propositions, resulting in a distribution appropriate to the 
granularity of the evidence. The term body of evidence 
(BOE) is used to describe the unit distribution of BPAs 
over propositional statements discerned by a frame of 
reference and in accordance with the information source. 
E-R provides a complete methodology for information 
integration, including the collection of information in its 
native frame of reference, discounting (due to the 
credibility of the source), translation to a related frame, 
projection into the future (or past), and fusion with other 
independent BOEs. 
Compatibility relations are used to characterise 
interrelationships between different propositional spaces. 
This allows reasoning to be carried out on information 
described at different levels of abstraction or on frames of 
reference with overlapping attributes. Figure 1 shows all 
the frames used in the target classification domain, with a 
link between two frames representing the existence of a 
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Figure 1: Sample CR-Editor window showing the frames that are linked by compatibility 
relations in the classification domain. 
compatibility relation. In this domain, a compatibility 
relation between the classification and diesels frames, 
represents the number of diesel motors known to be 
available on each platform class. Therefore, evidence 
about the number of diesel motors observed provides 
information about the type of platform. 
E-R uses Dempster's rule of combination (Lowrance et 
a!, 1991) to fuse multiple independent BOEs into a single 
BOE, emphasising points of agreement and 
deemphasising points of disagreement. Dempster's rule is 
both commutative and associative (ie, evidence can be 
combined in any order) providing a consensus of what 
was disparate opinion. Alternative fusion algorithms have 
also been proposed to counter perceived weaknesses of 
Dempster's rule. Horizon has implemented Dempster's 
rule as well as Smets algorithm (Smets, 1993) and we are 
currently evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. 
Initial results suggest Smets algorithm may suit this 
military problem as it provides a conservative weighting 
of evidence. Further, Smets method of distributing 
conflicting evidence to the unknown proposition (which 
states the true proposition may not be an element of the 
frame) suits the dynamic military domain where weapons 
and platforms are rapidly evolving. Users may then be 
trained to recognise that a high value for the unknown 
proposition may suggest (I) a high level of conflict in the 
evidence (2) signature data for a target is not included in 
the database, or (3) the target may be deliberately 
masking its identity by altering its recognisable 
signatures. 
The selection of this method for dealing with uncertainty 
was not based on competency, as probability theory and 
fuzzy logic are very capable of representing uncertain 
information. Instead, E-R was eventually selected over 
probability theory for its natural representation and 
manipulation with information contained at different 
levels of abstraction (Gordon and Shortliffe, 1985 and 
Almond, 1995) and in different frames of reference. 
3.1 INDEPENDENCE OF EVIDENCE 
The concept of independence is controversial in the areas 
of E-R and probability theory (Dawid 1979). Often 
centring around the areas of experimental independence 
or conditional independence, these theories have tended 
to handle dependence inadequately (Pearl 1988, Shafer 
1981, Walley 199 1, Kahneman, et a/ 1982). These 
criticisms are usually based on the difficulty of acquiring 
the appropriate evidence values, and applying an 
independence test to the data. 
It has been proposed that conditional independence 
between BOEs is not sufficient to guarantee the validity 
of Dempster's fusion algorithm (Voorbraak 1991). 
However, these papers fail to provide a decisive 
argument, or unbiased counter- intuitive example, that 
proves conditional independence combined with 
screening of BOEs by a domain expert is insufficient for 
guaranteeing independence of evidence. Hence, when 
using Horizon one makes the following two assumptions 
about the BOEs being fused using Dempster's rule: 
• the human operator can determine whether BOEs are 
based on the same observations, and are therefore 
dependent (e.g., two intelligence reports quoting the 
same source are not independent). 
• people (i.e., the expert and knowledge engineer) can 
accurately and confidently determine whether two 
events or actions are independent, as proposed by 
Pearl (1988), Shafer (1976, and 1981), Walley (1991), 
and Spiegelhalter and Lauritzen ( 1990). 
There is a growing number of successful applications of 
E-R to real world problems in the literature, including 
submarine tracking, sonar data interpretation, anti-air 
threat identification and naval intelligence analysis 
(Lowrance et al 1991 ) . The existence of these positive 
experiences demonstrate a level of maturity of the 
technology and implies, at least empirically, that 
dependent BOEs are being identified (or perhaps weak 
dependencies that are not identified have minimal effect 
on the conclusions). 
4. THE HORIZON PROGRAM 
The software package called Horizon 1 (currently at the 
prototype stage) is a domain-independent E-R system that 
has been applied to the mine threat evaluation domain and 
is currently being applied to the target classification 
problem. One challenge in developing this information­
fusion software package is to make sure the design does 
not require the user to understand the intricacies ofE-R (a 
goal we are still working towards). However, it is 
anticipated that a certain amount of understanding 
(training) is required to distribute evidence in an E-R 
manner, as well as ensure the information is independent. 
Horizon is a decision-aid program that requires a 
knowledge engineering process to take place before it can 
be applied to a problem. This involves capturing the 
domain by first establishing the frames of reference used 
to represented BOEs, and generating the compatibility 
relations between those frames. The amount of 
knowledge engineering required will depend on the 
1 Horizon is defined in Webster's Dictionary as the fullest range or 
widest l imit of perception, interest, appreciation, knowledge, or 
experience. 
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domain under investigation. The target classification 
domain consists of 16 frames of reference used to 
describe different attributes of a target. The compatibility 
relations are constructed with the aid of an expert, and 
represent the frames of reference in which one expects 
information to arrive, or may require conclusions to be 
presented. 
Knowledge engineering of the target classification 
domain presented in this paper was a straightforward, 
albeit laborious, task. The relationships between platform 
classification and its various components (e.g., number of 
shafts) were extracted from reference material such as 
Jane's Fighting Ships (Sharpe, 1995). This domain 
describes the ships and submarines from a selection of 
countries in the pacific theatre; which includes large and 
small navies such as the USN and Papua New Guinea's 
Navy respectively. 
Horizon provides a graphical user interface for the real 
time display and editing of compatibility relations, called 
the CR-Editor. The CR-Editor has two types of windows. 
The Frame Gallery window links frames for which 
compatibility relations exist (displayed in Figure 1). The 
CR-windows display the compatibility relations between 
two frames of reference with the propositions of each 
frame lined up on each side. Links between these 
propositions represent information in one frame of 
reference that is simultaneously true in the other frame of 
reference. For example, the Oberon class submarine 
(from the classification frame) in Horizon is linked to: 
• Australia and Canada (country frame); 
• SSK (type frame); 
• 17 (Speed frame in kts); 
• 2 (number of diesels frame); 
• I (number of shafts frame). 
The CR-Editor was used to aid in the knowledge 
engineering of the target classification domain, and would 
be used to update the compatibility relations as navies 
acquire new assets or upgrade current assets. 
Information collected from the environment (section 2) 
can be entered into the system in three ways. Firstly, 
static information (such as a database of platforms) that 
does not change rapidly can be stored as BOE data files, 
and read into Horizon when the system is initialised. 
Secondly, dynamic information can be entered 
automatically into Horizon's database from the combat 
system (e.g., sensors, signal processing units, expert 
systems, etc.). Finally, other dynamic information (such 
as surveillance reports) can be entered directly into the 
system as it arrives using the user interface window 
shown in Figure 2. This requires the user to select the 
frame of reference, then distribute belief among the listed 
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Figure 2: Windows used to create or edit a new BOE. 
propositions. The interface window is also used to edit 
and update all forms of information when required. 
Horizon represents and manipulates BOEs in an object 
oriented manner (see Figure 3). Each BOE represented by 
an icon and is stored in its native frame of reference, 
where it can be selected to be included in a calculation. At 
present the calculation operations include discount 
(reduces the confidence in a BOE), translate (move to a 
new frame), and fuse (combine BOEs using one of three 
fusion algorithms). Once the user has selected the BOEs 
to be included in the calculation, the operation is chosen. 
If discount is selected the user supplies a discount rate (a 
percentage between 1 and 100) at which time Horizon 
produces a secondaryl BOE with a modified belief 
distribution. If the translate operations are selected, the 
user is prompted to choose the frame in which the 
conclusion should be expressed and Horizon generates 
the new BOE by performing the minimum number of 
intermediate translations. 
2 A secondary BOE is a body of evidence that is generated through the 
manipulation of initial BOE(s). 
The operator may also chooses to perform a fusion 
operation using either Dempster's rule of combination 
(Shafer 1976), a least commitment algorithm (Mansell 
1997), or a dependent evidence algorithm (Mansell 1997). 
The system will carry out the necessary translations, 
presenting the resulting BOE in the conclusions window 
(Figure 4). The display window presents the pooled 
evidence for and against all non-zero propositional 
statements, as well as a measure of uncertainty (being the 
amount of evidence that neither supports nor contradicts 
that statement). 
Horizon is written in Allegro Common Lisp, with the user 
interface being written in PC/CLIM, making the package 
portable to either PC or UNIX machines. Horizon's 
"point-and-click" interface has been commended for its 
easy of use and provision for rapid interpretation of 
information (a critical feature of Naval systems). 
4.1 AUTO-DISCOUNTING 
Horizon also introduces the concept of auto-discounting 
as a way to condition each BOE prior to fusion. This uses 
TransLation-1 
ntelligence-1 8 
Sonar-1 
ESM-1 
..L ---
Sonar-4 Translatl.on-9 
A Target Classification Decision Aid 363 
Figure 3: Window displaying the fusion of multiple BOE. 
the BOE's measure of confidence in the source and its 
ability to accurately interpret the environment. Auto­
discounting (as the name suggests) is the automatic 
discounting of intelligence infonnation and sensor reports 
based on their credibility. In practice, this requires that 
each BOE is assigned a measure of confidence in the 
source, and is initiated only after the user begins a fusion 
operation. 
To be consistent with Australian Navy tenninology, 
Horizon uses three levels of confidence in an infonnation 
source; certain, probable and possible. Horizon requires 
each BOE be given a measure of confidence in its source, 
the default being probable. Each of these measures 
represents a discount rate for a discount operation. These 
rates are user configurable3 and are currently set at: 
• Certain: discount rate = 0% (representing complete 
confidence in the source). 
• Probable: discount rate = 20% (moderate confidence 
in the source). 
' Investigations into the appropriateness of these values is ongoing, but 
initial results are positive. Most of the debate here has been whether 
Certain should have a zero discount rate, or a very low value (e.g., 5%). 
• Possible: discount rate = 40% (low confidence in the 
source). 
The function of auto-discounting is an option that can be 
selected or de-selected prior to the execution of any 
operation, and takes place only once at the beginning of 
any fusion operation (ie, prior to translation). The 
confidence level is set from the Edit-BOE window using a 
check box with the three options certain, probable, and 
possible (see Figure 2). 
The inclusion of an auto-discounting feature in Horizon 
serves two purposes. First, automatic discounting of 
evidence by the identity of its source allows us to 
minimise personal biases4 contained in BOEs provided by 
humans. In addition, a sensor's supervisor unit or 
horizon's user may provide this measure of confidence in 
a BOE based on recent history or the conditions under 
which the infonnation was acquired. A Second reason for 
introducing the measure of confidence in a source's 
credibility is to circumvent the Zadeh objection (Zadeh, 
1984). Zadeh (1984) showed that if a propositional 
" In my experience, uniformed personnel as a whole tend to 
overestimate quantitative measures of belief, while conservatively 
estimating their confidence in that measure. 
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Figure 4: Window used to display the result of fused BOEs. This window presents the amount of 
evidence supporting, uncommitted (uncertain), and contradicting all non-zero propositional statements. 
statement has zero or very low BPA in one BOE, then 
that propositional statement will always have zero or low 
support when fused with other BOEs, irrespective of the 
level of support. This occurs because when multiplying 
one number by a zero or very low number, one always 
produce a zero or very low number. By using these 
additional confidence measures the auto-discounting 
routine redistributes the BP As resulting in a moderate 
(not zero or very low) BPA for the set of all propositions. 
Hence, if one BOE incorrectly overlooks the possibility 
of a proposition being true, it may still gain significant 
support from other BOEs after fusion. 
One drawback to auto-discounting is the information 
content of the BOE is lowered proportional to a the 
measure of confidence (ie, the associated discount rate). 
The consequence of this redistribution is that results may 
become inconclusive. This is particularly true when initial 
information quality is bordering on the inconclusive (i.e., 
one proposition, or set of propositions, is only slightly 
favoured over the others after a standard Dempster's Rule 
fusion). Under these circumstances auto-discounting is 
not recommended. To counter this, the operator could be 
trained to use auto-discounting by default. However, 
when inconclusive result are produced he/she could be 
trained to redo the fusion without auto-discounting. 
4.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
An essential part of decision aid software is providing the 
user with some way to review or understand how the 
conclusion was derived (ie, an explanation facility). 
Endowing a system with such a feature contributes to the 
users confidence in the system by making it more 
transparent. This also provides him/her the opportunity to 
analyse the decision process and perhaps restructure and 
re-evaluate the problem. Horizon generates an 
explanation based on the measure of information, !(bel), 
reported in Xu and Smets ( 1996): 
I(bel) =- �)ogq(a), 
a-;;0 
where q(a) is the commonality function: 
q(a) = L m(B) . 
a�B�B 
Horizon's explanation algorithm also relies on the 
additive property of this measure of information. That is, 
J(bel12)=I(bel1)+I(bel2), where bel12 is the belief function 
that results from the combination of bel1 and bel2 using 
Dempster's unnormalised rule. The full implementation 
of this algorithm and has been reported in Xu and Smets, 
(1996) and has been adapted to apply to Mansell's (1997) 
dependent evidence fusion rule. Those BOEs most 
influential on the conclusion are identified by 
highlighting the links in the main window (Figure 3). A 
qualitative explanation may also be displayed in the form 
of a text window that identifies the most and least 
influential BOEs. 
In Figure 3 the Eye-Witness BOE had the most impact on 
the conclusion (signified by a red link to the conclusion 
BOE). The user may choose to discount or remove Eye­
Witness and recalculate the conclusion if his/her 
confidence in the BOE is in question. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Initial results from the target classification domain 
indicate that independence of evidence is not a serious 
concern for most sources. However, this may not be the 
case when dealing with intelligence reports, as it is often 
difficult to determine independence of sources 
(particularly when the basis of the reports are unknown). 
Horizon includes an algorithm to fuse suspected 
dependent BOEs and the utility of this function is under 
investigation. 
Horizon has been trialed on a limited set of synthetic data 
to demonstrate the suitability of evidential reasoning to 
information fusion. On this data (up to 20 BOEs) the 
fusion runs at near real time, with frames containing 
between 3 and 15 propositions, (and an average size of 
8.6). Preliminary results for a worst case computation 
show that for 35 BOEs with between 8 and 352 (average 
211) propositions, Horizon takes 2.3 minutes to perform 
25 discounting operations, 29 translation operations and 
35 fusion operations on a Pentium 133. This time frame is 
considered reasonable for some tactical situations (e.g., 
target classification onboard a submarine). However, 
Horizon is a technology demonstrator and is therefore not 
optimised to be fast or efficient. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This p aper describes the target classification problem and 
the Horizon decision aid currently under development. 
Preliminary examination of this software confmns that 
evidential reasoning is an appropriate technique for 
dealing with high level information fusion. Further, the 
methodology is sufficiently mature to allow the 
development of robust decision systems that can 
accurately fuse and display tactical information. 
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